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ABSTRACT The article examines the post-disaster response to recent urban-centered
calamities in Indonesia, extracting lessons learned and identifying speciﬁc implications
for public health. Brief background information is provided on the December 2004
tsunami and earthquakes in Aceh and Nias and the May 2006 earthquake in Yogyakarta
andCentralJavaprovinces.Anotherbriefsectionsummarizesthepost-disasterresponseto
both events, covering relief and recovery efforts. Lessons that have been learned from the
post-disaster response are summarized, including: (a) lessons that apply primarily to the
relief phase; (b) lessons for rehabilitation and reconstruction; (c) do_s and don_ts; (d) city-
speciﬁc observations. Finally, several implications for urban public health are drawn from
the experiences to address health inequities in the aftermath of disasters. An initial
implicationistheimportanceofundertakingaseriousassessmentofhealthsectordamages
and needs shortly following the disaster. Then, there is a need to distinguish between
different typesof interventions andconcerns during the humanitarian (relief)andrecovery
phases. As recovery proceeds, it is important to incorporate disaster preparation and
prevention into the overall reconstruction effort. Lastly, both relief and recovery efforts
must pay special attention to the needs of vulnerable groups. In conclusion, these lessons
are likely to be increasingly relevant as the risk of urban-centered disasters increases.
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BACKGROUND
Indonesia has recently been struck by a series of major disasters that have largely
affected cities: the 2004 tsunami and earthquakes (devastating the cities of Banda
Aceh and Meulaboh) and the 2006 central Java earthquake (impacting the city and
suburbs of Yogyakarta) with an ensuing tsunami (hitting the southwest Java resort
town of Pangandaran). Background is provided in this section on the impact of
these calamities and the post-disaster response in each case.
Recent Calamities in Indonesia
Tsunami and Earthquakes in Aceh and Nias On December 26, 2004, a massive
earthquake registering 9.0 on the Richter scale struck 150 km off the coast of Aceh
province. This triggered a tsunami that hit Aceh 45 min later and devastated an
800-km coastal strip. Three months later, another powerful earthquake hit the
islands of Nias and Simeulue. Roughly 130,000 people died in these events with
another 37,000 missing and presumed dead.
1 The disasters left over 500,000 people
homeless, with more than 100,000 homes in need of rebuilding. Damages and
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i144losses were calculated at US$4.5 billion, with the most affected sectors being
housing, agriculture and ﬁsheries, infrastructure, and the environment.
2 Much of
the impact was in the cities of Banda Aceh (one-quarter of the city_s 400,000 people
were killed) and Meulaboh (30,000 of the population of 120,000 were lost).
Earthquake in Yogyakarta and Central Java On May 27, 2006, an earthquake
measuring 6.3 on the Richter scale struck Java island about 33 km south of Bantul
district in the highly urbanized Yogyakarta Province.
19 The tremors lasted for 52 s,
and hundreds of aftershocks followed. Striking in the early morning hours, the
earthquake trapped many people in their homes, which subsequently collapsed. The
disaster took over 5,700 lives (4,659 in Yogyakarta Province and 1,057 in Central
Java province) with injury estimates ranging from 37,000–50,000. The total
amount of damages and losses was initially estimated at US$3.1 billion, i.e., much
higher than those caused by the tsunami in Sri Lanka, India, and Thailand, and
similar in scale to the earthquakes in Gujarat (2001) and Pakistan (2005). Much of
the damage was done to dwellings (300,000+ need to be rebuilt) and private sector
buildings with relatively less damage to infrastructure than in Aceh and Nias.
3
Post-Disaster Response
Aceh and Nias During a 3-month period ending on March 31, 2005, relief operations
proceeded and achieved several important milestones:
– unprecedented generosity in the form of pledges, material and human resources;
– schools reopened more-or-less on-time, albeit in often temporary facilities;
– there was no outbreak of infectious diseases
4;
– food was distributed to virtually all affected areas;
– hundreds of thousands of tons of tsunami debris were cleared;
– temporary shelters (tents and barracks) were made available to those who could
not be housed with friends and relatives;
– cash-for-work programs were initiated to provide families with an income.
At the same time, several recovery-related events were underway: (a) Bappenas
initiated and concluded a participatory process to develop a master plan for
rehabilitation and reconstruction; (b) the government decided to create a special
ministerial-level agency to coordinate the reconstruction (the Badan Rehabilitasi
dan Rekonstruksi or BRR); and (c) donors consolidated their pledges for the
reconstruction, including creation of a $550 million multi-donor trust fund.
20
During the recovery, impressive physical progress has taken place despite
unfavorable conditions. For example, nearly 42,000 houses have been built or are
under construction, 524 schools have been constructed with 2,430 new teachers,
113 health facilities have been restored, 490 km of roads have been restored, the
agriculture sector has been largely revived, and 148,000 micro-credit loans have
been made.
5 This was achieved in a province that suffered from 30 years of civil
strife, with a pre-tsunami reputation for corruption where, after the disaster, local
government was devastated, transport and logistics are a continuing challenge, and
pressure for autonomy (including the application of shariah law) makes for
complicated local politics. Still, the needs are immense: nearly 80,000 houses still
need to be built along with 1,500 additional schools and 2,500 km of roads. The
economy is still artiﬁcially driven by the reconstruction, inﬂation in 2006 is much
higher than the national average at 23% (down from over 40% in 2005), low
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island continue to be underserved by the recovery.
Yogyakarta and Central/SW Java The response to the 2006 earthquake and
tsunami differed, partly given the smaller scale of the disaster. Government agencies
and civil society organizations reacted more quickly to provide relief, partly because
the affected areas were much more accessible and partly because effective local
governments were able to respond. Domestic health staff from around the country
were mobilized overnight to provide emergency relief, while ﬁeld hospitals and
orthopedic help were provided quickly by international assistance. A damage and
loss assessment was pulled together in the 2 weeks following the earthquake by
Bappenas and the international community. The earthquake eerily also took place
shortly before the follow-up government–donor coordination meeting where the
focus was on reconstruction. At the meeting, Bappenas and local governments
committed to prepare an action plan for recovery. For the tsunami, no in-depth
damage and loss assessment was conducted and no action plan is being developed.
Instead, opportunities are being sought to link reconstruction efforts, given the
physical proximity of the disaster-affected areas.
The relief effort proved generally effective, with widespread medical care and
limited disease outbreaks (tetanus was not properly controlled), provision of
temporary shelters, distribution of food, reopening of schools, etc. The latest ﬁgures
indicate that 250,000 emergency shelter kits have been distributed and 27,000 tons
of food and nonfood items have been delivered.
6 Promises of compensation were
made by both the Yogyakarta and Central Java provincial governments, although in
different amounts and schemes, but neither fully materialized. Homeowners have
not waited in many cases and are rebuilding using recycled debris. On the ofﬁcial
side, an initial 3,000 homes are under construction through the World Bank_s
community-driven Urban Poverty Project, and several donors are supporting large-
scale provision of low-cost core shelter.
GENERAL LESSONS LEARNED
These calamities with a high urban impact provide a wealth of information and
experience from which lessons can be culled to improve how we respond to future
disasters. This section summarizes two sets of lessons: those learned from the relief
phase and those that have emerged from the longer period of rehabilitation and
reconstruction. The section concludes with a simple set of do_s and don_ts as
guidance for the future and urban-oriented lessons.
Lessons from the Relief Phase
The World Health Organization (WHO) recently conducted a regional forum
(Health Action in Crises) that generated a useful set of lessons learned from the
relief phase of recent disasters in the Indian Ocean area and which have broader
applicability beyond the health sector. These are summarized in Table 1 below.
Lessons from the Recovery Phase
Lesson: Clear designation of a coordinating mechanism facilitates both relief and
recovery. At the same time, space should be made for informal mechanisms. Both
LEITMANN i146should operate at three levels: within government, within the international
community, and between government and the international community.
Lesson: Outlining roles, responsibilities, outcomes, and time frames in moving
from relief to recovery can help to better focus post-disaster response resources.
Speciﬁc tools like a clear damage and loss assessment and a straightforward
recovery strategy can assist this process.
17
Lesson: Attention to good governance is a fundamental building block of any
post-disaster response. Integrating public participation, transparency, and account-
TABLE 1 Lessons learned from recent crises
7
Area Lesson
Preparedness Preparedness and national capacity
building for risk management and
vulnerability essential
Information Immediate availability of up-to-date and
credible information essential for
assessing, monitoring, and taking
actions in emergencies
Cluster approach Positive experience, but future
implementation requires additional
efforts in management, planning,
and institutional capacity building
Response Improvement of response needed
in mass casualty management,
water and sanitation, nutrition,
noncommunicable diseases, maternal
and newborn health, mental health
Private sector involvement Private sector and military frequently
involved; need to agree on procedures/
criteria for collaboration, and joint efforts
Health, nutrition, and watsan/hygiene Gaps in joint work in nutritional
assessments and medical aspects of
management of nutrition; need to
strengthen coordination between
the health, water and sanitation,
and nutrition clusters
Vulnerable groups Vulnerability of children and pregnant
women need to be addressed;
need for data disaggregated by sex;
need to assess impact of response
on women and ﬁeld female workers;
adequate supplies in reproductive
health and emergency obstetrics
Local expertise Local experts trained to international
standards will form a valuable resource for
their region, providing long-term support
Human resources Identiﬁcation and mobilization of
appropriately equipped and trained
personnel quickly is essential; important
to have a roster of experts on call
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improved implementation, and reduced corruption.
Lesson: Relief and recovery efforts will be more effective if they identify, use,
and strengthen existing social capital (community-based skills, programs, and
networks). The community-driven approach to post-disaster recovery, which builds
on this social capital, requires signiﬁcant investments of time and human resources
but has results in greater client satisfaction, more rapid disbursement, and local
empowerment.
Do_s and Don_ts
A recent self-assessment exercise by the Multi-Donor Fund for Aceh and Nias
8 has
generated a set of lessons, summarized in Table 2, which can be readily turned into
a short list of do_s and don_ts for post-disaster response.
Lessons for Cities
As urban areas were particularly hard-hit in the Indonesian disasters, it is possible
to translate some of the general lessons listed above into city-speciﬁc observations.
Some preliminary guidance would include:
– During the relief phase, municipal authorities can take the lead in specialized
activities such as treating serious casualties or debris management because they
are especially equipped to do so (in these cases, with hospitals and waste
management services).
– To do so, municipal departments and services need to heighten their awareness of
disaster risks and the ability to coordinate their responses.
– The partial destruction of urban neighborhoods and infrastructure can be an
opportunity to build back better with improved designs, facilities, and services
– Enforcing building codes and ensuring that earthquake-resistant construction
techniques are used in the recovery process are important mitigating measures
against future disasters.
TABLE 2 Summary of post-disaster do_s and don_ts
Do Don_t
Be realistic about the timing and
approach to rebuilding homes,
considering the need for emergency,
transitional and permanent shelter
Construct only shelters; instead,
build settlements with
infrastructure and land tenure
through a participatory planning
process
Pick the right partners and delivery mechanisms
to maximize the speed and effectiveness of investments
Neglect logistics and transportation
needs that can create real
bottlenecks that will slow down
both relief and recovery efforts
Pay attention to environmental consequences
in the relief and recovery phases to avoid
costly mistakes later on
Downplay the importance of
monitoring, evaluation,
and quality control which are
critical for managing the
post-disaster response
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planning (master plans, spatial planning, city development strategies, etc.)
– Cities may receive a disproportionate share of recovery resources simply because
they may be more accessible and better-equipped than remoter rural areas.
ADDRESSING HEALTH INEQUITIES IN THE AFTERMATH
These more general lessons can now be brought down to the level of how public
health is delivered following a disaster in a more equitable manner. The analysis here
relieslessonspeciﬁcexamplesfromtheIndonesiancontextandmorefromdecadesof
global experience by WHO and others. Four areas are emphasized in this article: (a)
assessing health sector damages and needs; (b) clearly differentiating the roles of
public health in the humanitarian and recovery phases; (c) incorporating disaster
prevention and preparedness in the recovery; and (d) addressing the needs of
vulnerable groups.
Assessing Health Sector Damages and Needs
Properly assessing the impact of a disaster on human health and the health care
system is fundamental to:
– establish health care priorities,
– follow trends and reassess priorities,
– detect and respond to epidemics,
– evaluate program effectiveness,
– ensure targeting of resources,
– assess the quality of health care.
9
During the relief phase, there is a need to gather basic loss data (number of
dead and injured), assess the threats to human health (especially epidemics),
determine what measures and investments need to be taken to respond to
immediate threats, and provide emergency care. Moving to the recovery phase,
the damage assessment needs to be converted into a concerted program to revive
the health sector and system so that they can increasingly deliver needed services to
reduce morbidity and mortality. There is also a need for post-disaster epidemiologic
studies to understand and address changes in disease transmission, and posttrau-
matic stress disorder/mental health.
Differing Roles in the Relief and Recovery Phases
The focus of the public health effort will differ between the emergency and
reconstruction phases of post-disaster response. For example, during the emergency
response, environmental health efforts would concentrate on disease surveillance,
water quality, safe food, sanitation, waste management, and related guidelines for
relief work. During rehabilitation and reconstruction, the emphasis would be on
developing an environmental health strategy, encouraging healthier settlements,
strengthening emergency response systems, and building preparedness.
10
More speciﬁcally, during the relief phase, the Centers for Disease Control have
identiﬁed a set of myths to be avoided and realities to recognize in the health
response. These are summarized in Table 3 below.
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disrupted health sector following a disaster. In most cases, this requires:
– equity—the expansion of service provision to underserved areas and populations
(this can integrate formerly divided health care services);
– effectiveness—increasing the access to and quality of key services such as surgical
basic care, laboratory, and other diagnostic services and in-patient care;
– appropriateness—adoption of new service delivery models to respond to new
health needs, a changed environment, or if the previous system was outdated;
– efﬁciency—greater overall efﬁciency with savings used to ﬁnance some of these
measures.
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Incorporating Disaster Prevention and Preparedness
It is generally agreed that there are three elements for effective disaster prevention
and preparedness: (a) an accurate analysis of hazards and vulnerable populations;
(b) formulation of disaster preparedness and response plans; and (c) communicating
prevention and preparedness to the public and key decision-makers.
12 More
generally, these elements are embodied in the Hyogo Framework for Action that
resulted from the 2005 World Conference on Disaster Reduction. Operationally,
they have been converted into a set of measurable benchmarks by WHO, both as
TABLE 3 Myths and realities in the public health response to disasters
9,11
Myth Realities
External medical volunteers with any
kind of medical background are needed
The local population almost always covers
immediate lifesaving needs
Only skills that are not available in the affected
country may be needed
Few survivors owe their lives to outside teams
Any kind of assistance is needed,
and it_s needed now!
A hasty response not based on impartial
evaluation can be counterproductive
Unrequested goods are inappropriate, burdensome,
divert scarce resources, and more often burned
than separated and inventoried
Seldom-needed items include used clothing, over-
the-counter, and prescription drugs, blood
products, medical teams, and ﬁeld hospitals
Epidemics and plagues are
inevitable after every disaster
Epidemics rarely occur after a disaster
Dead bodies will not lead to catastrophic
outbreaks of exotic diseases
Proper resumption of public health services
will ensure safety (immunizations, sanitation,
waste disposal, water quality, and food safety)
The community is too shocked
and helpless to contribute
Dedication to the common good is the most
frequent response to natural disasters
across all cultures
Most rescue, ﬁrst aid, and transport is from other
casualties and bystanders
LEITMANN i150guidance and to enable evaluation of a country or a subnational area_s performance
in this area (see Box 1).
Addressing the Needs of Vulnerable Groups
The composition and needs of vulnerable populations will differ according to the
location and nature of each disaster. Typically, though, vulnerable groups include:
the poor, women, children, the elderly, the handicapped, and people with
preexisting mental disorders.
14 These groups may suffer disproportionately during
a disaster, may need specialized medical attention during the relief phase, and could
have speciﬁc concerns during the recovery such as their ability to access appropriate
health care services.
Disasters can also create a new class of vulnerable group—people with
psychiatric disorders due to trauma, from the disaster, which often manifests only
1 to 3 months following the event. The magnitude of this vulnerability can be quite
sizeable. For example, it is estimated that between 400,000 and 600,000 adults
throughout Honduras were emotionally affected by the Hurricane Mitch disaster.
Posttraumatic stress syndrome and depressive disorder are the two most common
reactions that affect survivors. For the countries hit by the 2004 tsunami, WHO
estimates that 20–40% of the affected population suffered mild psychological
distress, 30–50% exhibited moderate or severe distress, and 10–15% had mental
disorders.
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BOX 1: WHO benchmarks for emergency preparedness and response (EPR)
13
Legal framework, functioning coordination mechanisms, and an organizational structure in place
for health EPR at all levels involving key stakeholders
Regularly updated disaster preparedness and emergency management plan for health sector and
SOPs (emergency directory, national coordination focal point) in place
Emergency ﬁnancial (including national budget), physical and human resource allocation and
accountability procedures established
Rules of engagement (including conduct) for external humanitarian agencies based on
needs established
Community plan for mitigation, preparedness and response developed, based on risk
identiﬁcation and participatory vulnerability assessment and backed by higher level capacity
Local capacity for emergency provision of essential services and supplies (shelters, safe
drinking water, food, communication)
Advocacy and awareness developed through education, information management, and
communication (pre-, during, and post-event)
Capacity to identify risks and assess vulnerability at all levels established
Human resources capabilities continuously updated and maintained
Health facilities built/modiﬁed to withstand expected risks
Early warning and surveillance systems for identifying health concerns established
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psychiatric treatment, psychotropic drugs, etc.) but also by rebuilding communities,
livelihoods, and social interaction to give people a renewed sense of place and
future. The delivery of mental health and psychosocial support services typically
occurs through four levels: (a) community mental health services; (b) mental health
care through primary health care; (c) care and support outside the formal health
sector; and (d) self and family care.
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CONCLUSION
These lessons are increasingly relevant as the risk of disaster augments. We are
likely to see more urban-centered calamities in the future due to: (a) continued
urbanization; (b) increasing population density; (c) more settlement in high-risk
areas; (d) increased exposure to technological and industrial hazards; (e) a higher
risk of terrorist incidents; (f) emerging infectious diseases such as SARS and avian
ﬂu
16; and (g) aging populations in industrialized countries.
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ON-LINE RESOURCES FOR POST-DISASTER RESPONSE
Asia Disaster Preparedness Center (http://www.adpc.ait.ac.th)
Center for International Disaster Information (http://www.cidi.org)
Center for Reconstruction and Development (http://www.rec-dev.com)
Crisis Web (http://www.crisisweb.org)
Disaster Relief (http://www.disasterrelief.org)
Disaster Resource Network (http://www.disaster-resource.com)
Disaster Response Network (http://www.disasterresponse.net)
Inter-Action (http://www.interaction.org/disaster)
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (http://
www.ifrc.org/what/dp/mitigate.asp)
Natural Hazards Center (http://www.colorado.edu/hazards)
PAHO Program on Emergency Preparedness (http://www.paho.org/english/PED)
ProVention Consortium (http://www.proventionconsortium.org)
UNDP Bureau for Crisis PreventionandRecovery (http://www.undp.org/erd/disred)
UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (http://www.unisdr.org)
World Bank Disaster Management Facility (http://www.worldbank.org/dmf)
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